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 Agenda: 
• Background on the Spacesuit batteries 
• Motivation and objectives 
• Trigger method selected and why 
• Assessments of current designs 
• Verification of subscale mitigation measures 
• Full scale LREBA with those measures leads to failure 
• Consequence of cell TR ejecta products to TR propagation 
• Full scale LREBA with adjacent cells protected from cell vent path 
• Bank test to verify benefits of cell fusing 
• Lessons learned to date 
 
Background - Li-ion Rechargeable EVA Battery 
Assembly (LREBA) 
1 
9P-5S Array of Samsung 2.6Ah 18650 cells to power the 
spacesuit helmet lights and camera and glove heaters 
Background – Li-ion Pistol Grip Tool Battery 
(LPGT) 
 10-cell Li-ion 18650 
battery: 
• 10S for discharge 
• 2P-5S for charge 
Battery is enclosed in 
tool holster except for 
end with the D-latch 
 
Background – EMU Long Life Battery (LLB) 
Design Features: 
 80 Li-ion cells (16p-5s) 
 ICR-18650J from E-one Moli Energy 
Background and Motivation 
 NASA is no longer relying only on prevention measures for 
reducing single cell internal short hazard: 
• Cell screening known to not be fool proof against latent 
defects that can lead to field failures 
• Reasonable design and operational measures have been 
shown to reduce severity 
 Revised battery safety standard (JSC 20793 RevC) requires 
determining the hazard by test in all designs > 80Wh and 
assessing possible severity mitigation measures 
 This assessment is a pathfinder for that approach and will be 
done on 3 EVA batteries 
 
Selected Bottom Patch Heaters For Triggering TR 
 Two small (3/4”x3/4”) patch heaters located on the bottom of cylindrical can: 
• Nichrome wire glued to Mica paper 
• Adhered to bare can by cement bases adhesive 
 Each has 6” of Nichrome wire for a total of 12” per pair: 
• Pair can be powered by up to 90W 
 Main benefit of design – more relevant cell internal short: 
• Deliver high heat flux away from seals, PTC, and CID located in cell header 
• Leaves an axial bond line undisturbed for gluing cell together in one plane 
• More likely to result in coincident cell venting and TR runaway 


















Temp vs time profiles of the TR event
Samsung ICR18650-26F with 








 TR output heat fairly independent of heater input power 
 High power preferred to reduce risk of biasing hot adjacent cells 
Higher W Triggers with Lower Wh Input 
Lower Wh input into the heater presents lower risk of biasing adjacent cells 
LREBA 9P Bank Test – Baseline Design 
 Picket fence 9P bank with cells in axial 
contact and with epoxy bond line between 
cells: 
• End cell trigger with 45W 
• Open air environment 
 Full cascade of cell TR propagation in ~10 
minutes 
 Similar result found with LPGT brick 
 LREBA and LPGT baseline designs found 
susceptible to TR propagation 
LPGT brick post TR Test 
First Round of Mitigation Measures 
 Ensure cell-cell spacing 1-2mm with FR4/G10 
capture plates: 
• Reduce thermal conduction from cell to cell 
 Integrate fusible links into Ni-201 bus plates on 
positive only: 
• Isolate cell with internal shorts from parallel 
cells 
• 15A open current 
• Reduce thermal conduction via electrical 
connection 
 Include radiation barrier between cells in 2mm 
spacing design 
 Test under inert gas: 
• Reduce chaos associated with burning cell 
ejecta 
 Results: 
• No TR propagation in all 4 tests conducted in 
inert gas 
o Radiation barriers helped slightly 
o But spacing between cells found most 
significant 
– Picket fence design propagated in 
inert gas 
• In open air, propagation was likely because of 
flammable ejecta impinging on adjacent cells 
Full Scale Battery Test – Total Propagation 
 End cell in corner of dogleg was triggered 
 All 45 cells went into TR over 29 minutes 
 231 seconds from trigger cell TR to adjacent cell TR 
 Flames exited housing after 5th cell driven into TR 11 
minutes into the test 
 Vented ejecta bypassed fusible links and created 
short paths 
 
Bank 1 Experienced A Sustained Short Immediately 
After TR of Trigger Cell 
Next Full Scale LREBA Test Configuration 
Cell Ejecta Exhaust Piped Top: 
 Macor (machinable glass 
ceramic) with G10 gasket 
between Ni bus and manifold 
top 
 Matching holes in housing for 
pipes 
 Mica paper wrapped on cell 
cans 
 Fusible bus bars on both 
positives and negatives: 
• Same 15A trip 9P bank inside LREBA housing with exhaust holes 
Details of New Mitigation Features 
 Gen 1 LREBA capture and Ni bus plates with same housing/lid 
 Special care to avoid heater wire termination to damage cell case: 
• Added mica paper between termination and cell case 
 Exhaust pipe manifold material Macor (machinable glass ceramic): 
• Very carefully fastened it to the G10 capture plate: 
o Place 3 layers of Kapton and 0.005” G10 gasket in between G10 capture 
plate and Macor manifold 
o Kapton layers are compliant and help seal the Macor/G10 gap 
• Al tape added top of pipes to seal pipes of non-trigger cells to fresh limit air 
circulation 
 Added Mica paper insulation to the cell cans of non-trigger cells 
More Photos of Mitigation Features 
Mica paper as radiation barriers and to 
electrically isolate cell cans 2-8 
Heater placed on end cells 1 & 9 
Machinable glass ceramic (Macor®) 
Fusible (15A) bus plates connected on 
both terminals 
Pre-Test Photos 
One active 9P bank in dogleg with end 
cell trigger heaters  powered at 90W 
4 dummy banks uncharged to take up 
volume inside enclosure 
Al foil covering housing ejecta holes to 
limit air circulation and prevent FOD 
entering 
No TR Propagation 
Half of heater fails open in first second, heater runs at 45W; nevertheless, TR reached in 72s. Bottom of trigger 
cell reaches 543C, while mid and top get to 319-344C. Cell 2 maxes out on all 3 TCs at 100C. 
Up Even Closer 
TR of trigger cell shorts the bank for ~1s, which blows open the positive & negative fuse of trigger cell, also 
positive link in cell 2 was found blown. The 15mV drop shown corresponds to 2.25A peak from the bank, not 
enough to blow 15A fusible links. But, data collected at 1Hz and may have missed true bottom of voltage dips.  
Trigger Cell Positive Fusible Link Opens 
At video time 13m:18s 
Cell Venting 
At video time 13m:19s 
Trigger Cell TR 
At video time 13m:20s 
Post-Test Photos 
 Bank voltage at 4.07V 
 Isolated Cell 2 voltage measured at 
2.5V (blown positive fuse) on 8/27 and 
1.1V on 8/29: 
• Internal soft short suspected 
 Megaohms measured between cell 4-9 
cans and housing 
 Negative fuse on trigger cell also found 
blown 
Preliminary Findings of Test 
 TR of trigger cell was not uniformly hot: 
• Only bottom TC > 500C 
• Top and mid did not exceed 350C 
 Half of heater failed, yet TR reached in 72s: 
• DPA of cell will determine if it internal temperatures exceeded melting temp of Al (660C) and where besides the 
bottom 
 Data was not truly collected at 10 Hz: 
• Limitation in the Labview data system makes it fail to increase data collection frequency 
 Cell 2 Status: 
• Cell 2 experienced an external short sufficient to blow its 15A positive fuse 
• No TR, but it subsequently experienced a soft internal short: 
o It is hoped that DPA of cell will reveal why 
o Its hot tabs may have overheated portions of adjacent separators layers  
 
Opened 
cell2 (+) link 
Repeat Run with Other End Cell in 9P Bank 
 Trigger cell #9 with 90W 
 No TR propagation, however cell 8 vented 
 What measures are need to increase safety margins: 
• Capture plate G10 material switched to Macor 
• Insulating interstitial material 
• Vaporizing heat sink 
Fuse (+) on Trigger Cell Blows 
63 seconds after heater is turned on and is bright for 3 seconds on video 
Cell Mica Paper Wrap Heat Affected Zones 
 Burn marks indicate cell 8 was more impacted than cell 2 bottom near 
heater: 
• Suggest that our heater edges may be too close to the adjacent cells 
• Moving to a single 45W heater (1”x0.5”) placed on bottom side of trigger 
cell opposite the adjacent cell 
 Burn marks on top of the mica paper similar on both cells: 
• Indicates some bypass of ejecta between the cell and G10 capture plate 
• The epoxy must be melting and may need to go to a higher temp epoxy 
Adjacent cells 8 and 2 showing significant heat affected zones 
Fusible Link Verification Test 
 Use G10 capture plates to seat the Ni bus 
plates and weld them to cells 
 Use Ni bus tabs to put specified currents for 
blow tests 
 Test new bus plate design at relevant 
conditions: 
• With cells welded to the Ni bus plates 
• 0.3mm to be tested at 8A (+ 2 reps) 
• 0.4mm to be tested at 9A (+ 1 rep) 
• 0.5mm to be tested at 11A (+ 1 rep) 
• 0.6mm to be tested at 13A (+ 1 rep) 
Ambient Fusible Link Blow Tests 
 0.3mm links blew at 8A in ~1s 
 0.4mm links blew at 9A in ~2-7s 
 0.5mm links blew at 11A in ~2s 
 0.6mm links blew at 13A in ~15s 
Fused open link (0.5mm) 
Vacuum blow tests remain to be done 
Fusible Links 
in Action 
View of the cell negatives 
 Cell voltage sense tabs 
routed under tile and 
terminated with fiberglass 
insulated wire 
 9P bank is immobilized 
with wire tie down to tile 
 Heater LED functions 
 
Notes: 
 Bead of epoxy exist 
between each cell to 
promote thermal 
conduction 
 Negative fuses are 
rated at 7A 
 Positive fuses are 
rated at 8A  
Fusible Link Test Findings 
Findings: 
• TR propagated from cell 1 to cell 7 like dominos 
• Each cell TR events was proceeded with negative 
fuse blowing 
• Timing of bank OCV dips coincides with video 
timing of fuse glowing and blowing 
• Nevertheless, we are able to deduce that short 
circuit currents occur during the TR propagation 
process and fusible links are opened and should 
help mitigate propagation 
Lesson Learned and Next Design Iteration 
• Redesign LREBA parts 
– Locate thinner, taller heater to side opposite of 
cell from adjacent cell 
– Add mica half cylinder to the trigger cell to protect 
adjacent cell - missed 
– Use high temp epoxy to bond cells to capture 
plates 
– Plug all housing holes with Al foil tape 
– Route all TCs away from trigger cell 
• Next run – same as previous except trigger 
cell 1 and add soft goods bag 
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Pre-Test Photos 
• High temp ceramic putty for gluing 
cells to capture plates 
• TC and heater power wires routed 
away from trigger cell 
Run 56 – New Cell/G10 adhesive 
Single heater powered at 33W, caused TR in trigger cell in 153s, trigger pipe temp reached 633C, 
trigger cell TCs reached 422-568C, and cell 8 TCs reached 124-196C, cell 7 reached 54C 
35 
Run 56 – Post Test 
Run 56 – Close up 
75 mV dip corresponds to a 10A in-rush current sufficient to blow trigger cell fuse(s) 
Next Run – Pre test 
Soft goods bag added to dog leg of the battery 
Trigger Cell Vents Smoke/Electrolyte 
1s later, Instantaneous fireball with 
sparks 
After 2s, Flaring 
Flaring lasts for 3s, then small flame for 15s 
20s from smoke vent to flame out 
Overall Plot 
TR of trigger occurs 310s after heater on. Trigger cell max temp range from 474-631C. 
Cell 2 max temp range from 147-317C. Cell 3 max is 80C 600s after heater on.  
Trigger pipe max is 1146C. 
Close Up on Short 
Bank is shorted 155s after heater on, causes 8 cell bank to dip to 3.758V for 0.3s, 
corresponding to a 37A short fed by 7 good cells (blowing neg fuse of trigger cell) 
Trigger cell most 
likely vents here 
Trigger pipe temp 
High Impedance Short Bleed Banks 
Bank at 0.27V by noon the next day and cell 2-8 fusible links intact 
Short duration temp spike in trigger cell middle 
OCV declined 
48mV in 1800s 
Indicates a 
~1.7A short 
Post Test – TMG Bag 
• Soft goods bag (rip stop nylon, 7 layers of aluminized mylar, and kevlar 
reinforced fabric) was quickly perforated by cell TR flare/flame 
• Need to reinforce it with higher temperature metal foils (ex, Ni) 
Battery DPA Pics 
Trigger cell Macor pipe broke in pieces 
No pipe on cells 2-8  
Bank Examination (positive end) 
Cell 1 Trigger 
Intact fuse on cell 2 + 
But polluted with soot 
Lessons Learned To Date 
 Design must prevent first TR propagation from initial failed cell: 
• Entire battery gets hotter with each subsequent cell TR event 
 Limiting cell-to-cell thermal conduction appears to work: 
• Spacing out the cells ≥ 1mm is very beneficial 
• Maximizing heat conduction between cells and enclosure may also work 
according to modelling 
 Parallel cell bussing can provide significant in-rush currents into failed cell, 
which gets them hot: 
• Individually fusing parallel cells is effective 
 Four nearly-full scale tests with no propagation are encouraging, but more 
tests with reinforced soft goods bag are needed 
 Managing the vent/ejecta path is critical: 
• Combustion of expelled electrolyte must directed away from adjacent 
cells with path sealed good high temperature materials & joints 
• Cell TR ejecta can bridge to adjacent cells and cause cascading shorts 
(suggests need for interstitial material between cells to protect cell cans) 
• Cell TR flame/flare attenuation is needed 
 Subscale test results can be misleading and no replacement for full scale test 
verifications 
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